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1. Introduction 
Nuclear forensics is the analysis of nuclear or 
radioactive material and any associated information 
to determine the history of the sample material. 
Nuclear forensic analysis includes sample 
characterization, interpretation of data and event 
reconstruction and attribution [6]. . 
Nuclear forensics was developed in the early 
1990s when the first cases of illicit trafficking of 
nuclear materials were being reported. It is 
becoming an increasingly important tool in the fight 
against illegal smuggling and trafficking of 
radioactive and nuclear materials, including 
radiological materials intended for industrial and 
medical use, nuclear materials such as those 
produced in the nuclear fuel cycle, and much more 
dangerous weapons-usable nuclear materials 
(plutonium and highly enriched uranium). A major 
focus of nuclear forensics is identifying the physical, 
chemical, and isotopic characteristics that 
distinguish one nuclear or radiological material from 
another. These signatures enable researchers to 
identify the processes used to initially create a 
material [4]. 
Databases and knowledge management systems 
are needed to support nuclear forensics. This effort 
has begun to be developed but needs systematic 
additional support. For example, the joint report of 
the Nuclear Forensics working group [5] mentioned 
that the DOE has created a database containing 
information about uranium compounds (U ores, U 
ore concentrates, etc.), including trace element 
concentrations, isotopic compositions of uranium 
and other elements, and other descriptive 
parameters. Various other groups also hold 
substantial data, but the consolidation of these data 
into an accessible nuclear forensics database has not 
taken place and the tools to utilize the database have 
not been developed. Developing the desired database 
will require significant cooperation with foreign 
governments and corporations. Different open-
source data resources have been used to compile a 
history of the malevolent use of radioisotopes, 
including a Global Chronology of Incidents of 
Chemical, Biological, Radioactive and Nuclear 
Attacks as of 1950–2005 [1]. All of these incidents 
were evaluated using several specific criteria such as 
specific material characteristics and the perpetrator’s 
intent for the radioactive material. 
Globally, there are a lot of places where radioactive 
materials that have passed through the nuclear cycle 
are produced, used, and stored. Ukraine has the 
most uranium ore resources in Europe and has 
accumulated a lot radioactive materials and wastes 
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from the Chernobyl catastrophe and from uranium 
production (tailings, technological facilities, dumps) 
associated with the former USSR. This inventory of 
radioactive materials presents a real risk, and it is 
necessary to be able to identify radioactive 
materials (composition, origin, and place of 
extraction or production) for nuclear forensics.  
2. Illicit trafficking of radioactive materials  
Given the availability of transit routes and Ukraine’s 
nuclear industry, as well as the numerous applications 
for radioactive sources inside the country, combating 
illicit trafficking of radioactive materials is a very 
important task that both Ukraine and its partners have 
focused on over the past decade. 
The International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA) Incident and Trafficking Database (ITDB) 
is a unique asset that assists the IAEA, participating 
States (120 countries as of 31 December 2012, 
including Ukraine) and selected international 
organizations in improving nuclear security. The 
ITDB System was established in 1995 to record and 
analyse incidents of illicit trafficking in nuclear and 
other radioactive materials. It accounts for all 
incidents in which nuclear and other radioactive 
material is out of regulatory control. The ITDB 
scope covers all types of nuclear material as defined 
by the Statute of the Agency (i.e., uranium, 
plutonium and thorium), naturally occurring and 
artificially produced radioisotopes, and 
radioactively contaminated material, such as scrap 
metal. States are also encouraged to report incidents 
involving scams or hoaxes where material is 
purported to be nuclear or otherwise radioactive. 
As of 31 December 2012, the ITDB contained a 
total of 2331 confirmed incidents reported by 
participating States. Incidents may be categorized in 
more than one group: for example, the theft and 
subsequent attempted sale of a radioactive source. 
Therefore the sum of the incidents in the groups is 
greater than the total number of incidents. Of the 
2331 confirmed incidents, 419 incidents involved 
unauthorized possession and related criminal 
activities (Fig. 1), 615 incidents involved reported 
theft or loss (Fig. 2) and 1244 incidents involved 
other unauthorized activities and events (Fig. 3). In 
the remaining 69 cases, the reported information 
was not sufficient to determine the category of 
incident [3]. 
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Fig. 1. Unauthorized possession and related criminal 
activities reported to the ITDB,1993-2012 
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
19
93
19
94
19
95
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
20
10
20
11
20
12
 
Fig. 2. Incidents reported to the ITDB involving theft 
or loss, 1993-2012 
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Fig. 3. Other unauthorized activities and events 
reported to the ITDB, 1993-2012 
In the case of radioactive, non-nuclear material, 
trafficking is made possible by their ready 
availability. There are also weaknesses in the 
accountancy of radioactive sources and in the chain 
of regulation and control in the movement of these 
materials from their countries of origin, through 
their transportation routes and transhipment hubs, to 
the countries of receipt. 
2.2. World Distribution of Uranium Deposits  
Determining the origin of the radioactive material is 
one of the objectives of nuclear forensics. Uranium 
deposits are considered potentially dangerous 
nuclear facilities and potential sources of illegal 
radioactive material trafficking. Therefore, a
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uranium deposit database is very important for 
nuclear forensics as well as providing information 
on the global distribution of uranium resources. The 
World Distribution of Uranium Deposits (UDEPO) 
with Uranium Deposits Classification was published 
by the IAEA in 2009. The UDEPO includes 
classification of global uranium deposits, technical 
information, and detailed geological information 
about regions, districts and deposits. 
As of 2012, there were 1520 reported uranium 
deposits worldwide. The information contained in the 
database can be useful for determining the origin of 
uranium ores. UDEPO can be divided into general (Fig. 
4), technical (Fig. 5) and geological information (Fig. 6).  
 
Fig. 4. UDEPO: General information  
The UDEPO database can be used to determine 
the identifying features of uranium ores from 
different deposits, including data on their geological 
location, structural features, host rocks, 
mineralization, and ore mineral composition. This 
database mentions uranium deposits located in 
Ukraine but does not contain any specific 
information. As a result, the Scientific and Technical 
Centre of Ukraine (STCU) has initiated research on 
uranium ore from the operating deposits in Ukraine 
to identify features useful for nuclear forensics. 
 
Fig. 5. UDEPO: Technical information 
 
Fig. 6. UDEPO: Geological information 
3. Nuclear Forensics steps in Ukraine 
Uranium ores from three operating deposits, 
Michurins’ke, Central, and Vatutins’ke, were 
studied to identify specific characteristics relating 
uranium ore concentrates to their place of origin. 
Ore samples contain specific characteristics of 
uranium ore concentrates that can link the 
concentrates to their place of origin. This 
information is an important component of the 
Ukrainian database on uranium materials.  
The deposits are genetically connected with the 
processes of ultra metamorphism of uranium-
containing rocks. Post ultra-metamorphic solutions 
penetrated along long-lived fault zones and led to 
sodium metasomatism and ore formation in albitites. 
Uranium was transferred in hydrothermal solutions 
in the form of uranyl-sodium-carbonate or uranyl-
potassium-carbonate ions (complexes). Diaphthorites 
(syenite-like desilicated rocks) were formed as a 
product of incomplete sodium metasomatism and are 
mainly contaminated with uranium and do not 
contain commercial ore mineralization [2, 7]. 
The primary rocks are different for each deposit. 
The ore-containing metasomatites that formed on the 
source rocks inherited their structural and textural 
peculiarities, percentage of dark colored minerals, 
etc. The ores from the Michurins’ke and Vatutins’ke 
deposits consist of apogranite, apomigmatite, and 
apogneiss albitites of Paleoproterozoic age. 
Apogneiss albitites are different from the first two 
types by higher content (up to 25-35%) of dark 
colored minerals. The ores from the Central deposit 
are represented by the only apogranitoid albitites, 
including albitites formed on fine-grained 
leucocratic and melanocratic aplite-like granites of 
the Lelekivs’ka suite.  
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Structural control of mineralization is obvious for 
each deposit and connected with correspondent 
faults in the tectonic and metasomatic zones.  
The primary differences in composition between 
the three ore deposits included the sooty uranium 
content (a mixture of black microaggregate 
minerals), uranophane and primary U-silicates 
(coffinite and nenadkevite), as well as the 
occurrence of brannerite, a U-titanate mineral. The 
major commercial phases observed in the 
Michurins’ke deposit ores were sooty uranium and 
uranophane. The primary silicate mineral was 
nenadkevite, a mixture of boltwoodite and uraninite. 
The primary oxide mineral was uraninite. Uranium 
titanites, including brannerite and davidite, made up 
approximately 4% of the ore. Major non-metallic 
minerals included albite (up to 75-90%), aegirine, 
chlorite, phlogopite, riebeckite, and epidote. The 
major commercial minerals of the Central deposit 
were brannerite, oxidized or completely altered 
brannerite with leucoxene-like products, and 
uraninite. The major non-metallic minerals were 
albite, phlogopite, chlorite, and carbonate. More 
rarely, aegirine, riebeckite, epidote, and sometimes 
hematite were observed. The major commercial 
phases of the Vatutins’ke deposit were uraninite, 
beta-uranophane, and a mixture of sooty uranium 
and nenadkevite. The major non-metallic mineral 
was albite. Secondary non-metallic minerals 
included chlorite, riebeckite, aegirine, hematite, 
carbonate, and epidote. 
Our observations and those found in [2, 7] 
confirmed that aegirine, riebeckite, chlorite, and 
epidote were widespread among the dark colored 
minerals from the Michurins’ke deposit, while 
phlogopite was more typical for the ore albitites 
from the Central deposit. Uranium oxides and 
nenadkevite were typical for the ores from the 
Michurins’ke deposit. These minerals rarely 
appeared in the Central deposit where brannerite 
was commonly found. In contrast, the Vatutins’ke 
deposit ores were fine-grained albitites formed on 
metasomatic orthogneisses. Radiometric counting 
data was collected for select isotopes from ores at 
the SE “Vostgok” laboratory (Table 1).  
Table 1: Average activities in representative uranium ore samples (Ci/kg) 
Deposit 226Ra ×10-7 230Th ×10-7 210Pb ×10-7 210Po ×10-7 Ub/10-7 Ci/kg 
Michurins’ke 3,88 3,04 4,37 3,62 81,56 5,44 
Central 2,94 1,85 3,17 2,13 5,78 3,91 
Vatutins’ke 10,47 8,72 11,04 9,38 225,00 15,19 
 
These data showed that the ores of the Vatutins’ke 
deposit had high Ra, Th, Pb, Po and U contents 
compared to the Central and Michurins’ke deposit ores, 
which had 2-10 times lower contents of these elements. 
4. Conclusion 
The development of information technologies has 
promoted the creation and improvement of specialized 
databases that provide information about the location, 
quantity and quality of mineral resources and their 
current associated components, as well as the 
geological, hydrogeological, mining, economic and 
other characteristics of the mineral resources in the 
country. It is important to create databases to 
document the origin, movement, and storage of 
radioactive and nuclear materials. The ability to 
identify characteristic features of these materials is 
critical for any country that deals with radioactive and 
nuclear materials in its territory. 
The study of ore samples from operating uranium 
deposits is considered a starting point for the 
identification of specific uranium ore characteristics 
that are indicative of their place of origin. This allows 
for the identification of nuclear material sources 
and helps to prevent their unlawful spread. 
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